Energy and information are two basic currencies of organic and social systems. A new technology that alters the terms on which one or the other of th'ese is available to a system can work on it the most profound changes. At the core of the Industrial Revolution, which began nearly three centuries ago, lay the substi tution of mechanical energy for the ener gy of man and animal. It was this revolu tion that changed a rural subsistence so ciety into an urban affluent one and touched off a chain of technological in novations that transformed not only production but also transportation, communication, warfare, the size of human populations, and the natural environment.
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It is easy, by hindsight, to see how inexorably these changes followed one another, how "natural" a consequence, for example, suburbia was of cheap, pri vately owned transportation. It is a dif ferent question whether foresight could, have predicted these chains of events or have aided in averting some of their more undesirable outcomes. The prob lem is not that prophets were lackingthey have been in good supply at almost all times and places. Quite the contrary, almost everything that has happened, and its opposite, has been prophesied. The problem has always been to pick and choose among the embarrassing riches of alternative projected futures; and in this, human societies have not demonstrated any large foresight. Most often we have been constrained to anticipate events just a few years before their occurrence, or even while they are happening, and to try to deal with them, as best we can. as they are engulfing us.
We are now in the early stages of a revolution in processing information that shows every sign of being as fundamen tal as the earlier energy revolution. Per haps we should call it the Third Informa tion Revolution. (The first produced writ ten language, and the second, the printed book.) This third revolution, which be gan more than a century ago, includes 1186 the computer but many other things as well. The technology of information com prises a vast range of processes for stor ing information, for copying it, for trans mitting it from one place to another, for displaying it, and for transforming it.
Photography, the moving picture, and television gave us,, in the course of a century, a whole new technology for storing and displaying pictorial informa tion. Telegraphy, the telephone, the phonograph, and radio did the same for storing and transmitting auditory infor mation. Among all of these techniques, however, the computer is unique in its capacity for manipulating and trans forming information and hence in car rying out. automatically and without hu man intervention, functions that had pre viously been performable only by the human brain.
As with the energy revolution, the con sequences of the information revolution spread out in many directions. First, there are the economic consequences that follow on any innovation that in creases human productivity. As we shall see, these are perhaps the easiest effects of technological change to predict. Sec ond, there are consequences for the na ture of work and of leisure-for the quali ty of life. Third, the computer may have special consequences for privacy and in dividual liberty. Fourth, there are con sequences for man's view of himself, for his picture of the universe and of his place and goals in it. In each of these directions, the immediate consequences are, of course, the most readily per ceived. (It was not hard to foresee that Newcomen's and Watt's engines would change the economics of mining in deep pits.) It is far more difficult to predict what indirect chains of effects these ini tial impacts will set off, for example, the chain that reaches from the steam engine through the internal-combustion engine to the automobile and the suburb.
Prediction is easier if we do not try to forecast in detail the time path of events and the exact dates on which particular developments are going to occur, but to focus, instead, upon the steady state to ward which the system is tending (/). Of course, we are not so much interested in what is going to happen in some vague and indefinite future as we are in what the next generation or two holds for us. Hence, a generation is the time span with which I shall be concerned.
My discussion will be divided into five parts, the last four corresponding to do mains of prediction: economics, the na ture of work and leisure, social con sequences, and how men and women view themselves. These essays in predic tion need to be preceded, however, by some analysis of the computer itself, and particularly its capabilities and potential in the area that is usually called artificial intelligence. This subject is taken up in the next section (2).
Computer Capabilities
The computer is a device endowed with powers of utmost generality for processing symbols. It is remarkable not only for its capabilities but also for the simplicity of its underlying processes and organization. Of course, from a hard ware standpoint it is not simple at all but is a highly sophisticated electronic ma chine. The simplicity appears at the level of the elementary information processes that the hardware enables it to perform, the organization for execution and con trol of those, processes, and the program ming languages in terms of which the control of its behavior is expressed. A computer can read symbols from an ex ternal source, output symbols to un ex ternal destination, store symbols in one or more memories, copy symbols, rear range symbols and structures of sym bols, and react to symbols condi tionally-that is. follow one course of action or another, depending on what symbols it finds in memory or in its input devices. The most general symbol-ma nipulating system that has been defined, the so-called Turing machine, requires no broader capabilities than these. The important limits on the powers of i com puter are limits on the sizes of its memo ries and the speed of its elementary pro cesses, and not on the generality of those processes.
There is great dispute among experts as to what the generality of the computer implies for its ability to behave in telligently. There is also dispute as to whether the computer, when it is behav-ing more or less intelligently, is using processes similar to those employed by an intelligent human being, or quite dif ferent processes. The views expressed here will reflect my own experience in research with computers and my inter pretation of the scientific literature. First, no limits have been discovered to the potential scope of computer in telligence that are not also limits on hu man intelligence. Second, the elemen tary processes underlying human think ing are essentially the same as the com puter's elementary information pro cesses, although modern fast comput ers can execute these processes more rapidly than can the human brain (3). In the past, computer memories, even in large computers, have probably not been as capacious as human memory, but the scale of available computer memories is increasing rapidly, to the point where memory size may not be much longer an effective limit on the capacity of comput ers to match human performance. Any estimate of the potential of the computer in the near or distant future depends on one's agreement or disagreement with these assumptions.
One common objection to the beliefs just expressed is that "computers can only .do what you program them to do." That is correct. The behavior of a com puter at any specific moment is complete ly determined by the contents of its mem ory and the symbols that are input to it at that moment. This does not mean that the programmer must anticipate and pre scribe in the program the precise course of its behavior. A program is not a sce nario; it is a strategy of action, and what actions actually transpire depends on the successive states of the machine and its inputs at each stage of the processneither of which need be envisioned in advance either by the programmer or by the machine. A problem-solving program applied to a particular puzzle situation does not prescribe all the steps to solve that puzzle; it prescribes a selective search strategy that, when followed, may lead the computer to discover a path to a solution. But selective search, under the guidance of strategies, is also the process that people use to solve puzzles.
Of course humans, through the pro cesses called learning, can improve their strategies by experience and instruction. By the same token, computers can be, and to some extent have been, provided with programs (strategies) for improving their own strategies. Since a computer's programs arc stored in the same memo ries as data, it is entirely possible for programs to modify themselves-tha t is, to learn.
Probably the most fundamental differ ences between today's computers and the human information-pro cessing sys tem have to do with the input organs that provide the interface between the system and its environment. Simulating the capa bilities of human eyes and ears has proved to be a much more difficult task than simulating the thinking processes that go on in the centra) nervous system. Computer capabilities in both visual and auditory domains, and particularly the former, fall far short of human capabili ties.
Over the past two decades a moderate amount of work has been carried on in the field usually called artificial in telligence to explore the potentialities of the computer that have been outlined above. Some of this research has been aimed at programming computers to do things which, if done by a person, would be regarded as intelligent. Another part of the research has been directed at simu lating not only the human capabilities but also the processes that human beings use in exercising these capabilities. The considerable progress that has been made in understanding the nature both of artificial and of human intelligence has hardly begun to translate itself into appli cations, and has been reflected to only a small degree in the actual practical uses of computers. Artificial intelligence re search has had an impact upon the search algorithms that are used to solve large combinatorial problems, it is on the verge of practical application in the realm of medical diagnosis, and it has had an important influence upon certain computer programming techniques (for example, list processing). But its main significance for practical affairs lies in the future.
How, then, have computers actually been used to date? At present, comput ers typically spend most of their time in two main kinds of tasks: carrying out large-scale engineering and scientific cal culations and keeping the financial, pro duction, and sales records of business firms and other organizations. Although precise statistics are not available, it would be safe to estimate that 95 percent of all computing power is allocated to such jobs. Now these tasks belong to the horseless-carria ge phase of computer de velopment. That is to say, they consist in doing things rapidly and automatically that were being done slowly and by hand (or by desk calculator) in the precomputer era.
Such uses of computers do not repre sent new functions but only new ways of performing old functions. Of course, by greatly lowering the cost of per forming them, they encourage us to un dertake them on a larger scale than be fore. The increased analytic power pro vided by computers has probably encour aged engineers to design more complex structures (for example, some of the very tall new office buildings that have gone up in New York and Chicago) than they would have attempted if their ana lytic aids were less powerful. Moreover, by permitting more sophisticated analy ses to be carried out in the design pro cess, they have also brought about signif icant cost reductions in the designs them selves. In the same way, the mechaniza tion of business record-keeping pro cesses has facilitated the introduction of improved controls over inventories and cash flows, with resulting savings in costs. Thus, the computer not only re duces the costs of the information-pro cessing operations that it automates but also contributes to the productivity of the activities themselves.
The remaining 5 percent of computer uses are more sophisticated. Let us con sider two different ways in which a com puter can assist an engineer in designing electric motors. On the one hand, the engineer can design the motor using con ventional procedures, then employ the computer to analyze the prospective op eration of the design-the operating tem perature, efficiency, and so on. On the other hand, the engineer can provide the computer wilh the specifications for the motor, leaving to the computer the task of synthesizing a suitable design. In the second, but not the first, case the com puter, using various heuristic search pro cedures, actually discovers, decides up on, and evaluates a suitable design. In the same way, the role of the computer in managing inventories need not be lim ited to record-keeping. The computer program may itself determine (on the basis of usage) when items should be reordered and how large the orders should be. In these and many other situa tions, computers can provide not only the information on which decisions are made but can themselves make the deci sions. Process-control computers, in automated or semiautomated manufac turing operations, play a similar role in decision-making . Their programs are de cision strategies which, as the system's variables change from moment to mo ment, retain control over the ongoing process.
It is the capability of the computer for solving problems and making decisions that represents its real novelty and that poses the greatest difficulties in pre dicting its impact upon society. An enormous amount of research and devel-opmental activity will have to be carried out before the full practical implications of this capability will be understood and available for use. In the single generation that modern computers have been in existence, enough basic research has been done to reveal some of the funda mental mechanisms. Although one can point to a number of applications of the computer as decision-maker that are al ready 20 or 25 years old, development and application on a substantial scale have barely begun.
Economic Effects of Computers
The direct economic effects of in troducing computers as numerical cal culators and decision-makers are like those of introducing any new form of capital that raises productivity and also improves the quality of the product. The computer (its hardware together with the associated system-programming costs) represents an investment in a capitalintensive, laborsaving device that has to justify itself, in competition with other possible forms of investment, through savings in clerical and other personnel costs together with the im provements it brings about in organiza tional decisions.
When the main motive of introducing the computer is to mechanize existing clerical operations-in the actuarial de partment of an insurance firm, say, or the accounting department of a manufac turing concern-then its main economic advantage stems from the reduction in clerical costs. When it is introduced to mechanize decision processes-engi neering design, for example, or control of stock or cash inventories-then its direct effect shows up as some form of productivity increase in the organiza tion's operations. In either case, there is nothing special about the computer that distinguishes it, in its economic effects, from any other capital investment. Any such investment can be expected to have a direct effect upon employment in the organizational components where it is introduced. When the accounting system is mechanized, fewer clerks and book keepers are needed, else there would be no economic motivation for mechaniz ing. Of course, if part of the motivation for the change is to improve the quality of the system's output, the operation may be expanded, and the net reduction in personnel may be smaller than would be estimated solely from the increase in efficiency. If there is sufficient elasticity of demand for the activity, personnel may actually increase.
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Again, this is a general economic issueof technological unemployment-that does not depend on any special proper ties of computers. They are simply one among the many laborsaving devices that have been appearing since the begin ning of the Industrial Revolution (and before).
Both standard'economic analysis and a targe body of empirical evidence dem onstrate that there is no relation, positive or negative, between the technological sophistication of an economy and the level of employment it maintains. From a systems standpoint, a cost reduction in any part of the system releases resources that can be employed to increase the output of goods and services elsewhere in the system. At any level of employ-. ment, from 0 to 100 percent, the total revenue received by wage earners and owners of capital and land as wages, interest, and rent is just sufficient to pur chase the total bundle of goods and ser vices that is produced. Economists some times disagree as to why economies, do not always operate at or near full employ ment, but they are unanimous in agree ing that the reason is not that they pro duce more than they can consume.
(Even Marxists agree with this proposi tion, although they argue that full em ployment cannot be maintained within the institutions of capitalism.) An even stronger statement can be made about the systems effects of costsaving technological innovations. We usually describe devices like computers (and most other machinery) as laborsaving because they require a lower ra tio of labor to capital than the methods they displace. But if we measure savings relative to output, they are usually both laborsaving and capital-saving. That is to say, a smaller capital investment per passenger mile is required to transport people by jet plane than to transport them by ox cart. Similarly, a smaller capital investment per multiplication is required if a large modern computer is used to do the arithmetic than if it is done on a desk calculator or with pencil and paper. (Do not forget to include the capi tal cost of the desk at which the clerk sits and the heated or air-conditioned room in which he or she works.) Now it is easy to show, for economic equilibri um and under reasonable assumptions about the supply of capital, that the in troduction of capital-intensive, cost-sav ing innovations will raise the level of real wages and increase the fraction of the total revenue that goes to wages. This prediction from economic theory is am ply supported by the histories of the industrialized economics over the pres ent century. As productivity has in creased (mainly as a consequence of technological innovation), real wages have steadily risen, as has labor's share in the total national product (4) . Now the rate of "technological change depends both upon the rate of discovery of new innovations and upon the avail ability of capital to turn them into bricks and steel (or wire and glass). In this process, computers compete with other forms of technology for the available capital. Hence, the process of comput erization is simply a part, currently an important part, of the general process of technological change. It might be de scribed, paraphrasing Clausewitz. as "a continuation of the Industrial Revolution by other means" (5) .
In taking this very global and bird'seye view of the economics of mechaniza tion, we should not ignore the plight of the worker who is displaced by the com puter. His plight is often genuine and serious, particularly if the economy as a whole is not operating near full employ ment, but even if it is. Society as a whole benefits from increased productivity, but often at the expense of imposing tran sient costs on a few people. But the sensible response to this problem is not to eschew the benefits of change; it is rather to take institutional steps to shift the burdens of the transition from the individual to society. Fortunately, our attitudes on these questions appear to be maturing somewhat, and our institution al practices improving, so that the wide spread introduction of the computer into clerical operations over the past genera tion has not called forth any large-scale Ludditism. In fact, during the depression that we are currently experiencing, in contrast to some earlier ones, tech nology has not been accused as the vil lain.
Effects on the Nature of Work
We see that, so far as economic effects are concerned, the computer simply pro vides a particular path toward higher productivity through industrialization. Whatever benefits it produces, it pro duces in this way; whatever problems it creates, it creates as other capital-in tensive innovations do. We must be care ful, however, not to evaluate social change solely in terms of its impact on wages and employment. Of equal impor tance are the effects it may have on the workplace, and even on leisure. Today we frequently hear the claim thai com puters and automation dehumanize work and that dehumanizatioo, in turn, causes alienation from work and society. These charges have been laid not only against contemporary developments in automation but against the whole pro cess of industrialization. They were stated eloquently in the Communist Manifesto more than a century ago and by numer ous social critics before and since. There has been a new surge of concern with the alienation issue in the past 10 years.
Three questions need to be asked about alienation. First, how much aliena tion is there-is there evidence that alien ation has been increased by computers and automation or. Unfortunately, comparable data are not available to measure the longer trends in job satisfaction over the whole past two centuries or so of indus trialization. Perhaps even if computers and automation do not intensify aliena tion, they confirm and complete a loss of satisfactions that was produced by the rise of the factory system. The answer to that question must be mainly specula tive. Clayre, however, recently threw some interesting tight on it by examining the attitudes toward work expressed in
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preindustrial folk literature and popular ballads (7). He finds few indications of a Golden Age in which work was generally regarded as pleasurable and satisfying. He concludes that, in general, daily work was the same burdensome necessity for peasants and craftsmen as it is for facto ry workers and clerks; and that life's satisfactions and pleasure were mainly sought, then as now, in leisure, not work.
Perhaps, however, we should not try to detect alienation in this indirect way but should look directly at the work places where computers have been in troduced, in order to see how they have changed the nature of work and its envi ronment. Sizable differences have been found in worker satisfaction among btuecollar workers in different kinds of facto ries, some of the important variables being job variety and worker control over the timing of work. It is not the case, however, that the most advanced forms of industrialization and automa tion produce the most tedious and re strictive jobs. On the contrary, those forms of work organization that appear to have been most alienating-typified by the auto assembly line or large-scale hand assembly operations-are declining in importance relative to other forms of mechanization. Blauner, for example, studied four industries in depth: printing, a traditional craft industry; textiles, a machine-tending industry; automobile assembly, highly mechanized with highly specialized jobs; and a highly automated continuous-process chemical manufac turing industry (8) . He found few in dications of alienation in printing and chemicals, considerably more in textiles, and most of alt in automobile assembly. The industry that best typifies modern automation-chemicals-was substan tially less alienating than the two that typify older kinds of mechanization.
If we look at office automation, we see that, here too. the kinds of jobs that are displaced tend to be those that are most repetitive and restricting. Whisler, who studied about 20 companies in the in surance industry, found that comput erization had produced only small and conflicting changes in the nature of cleri cal and supervisory jobs (9). The new jobs placed greater demands on the em ployees for accuracy and reliability in performance, but they were not gener ally perceived as being significantly more or less pleasant or more or less boring than before. And. perhaps most impor tant of all. whatever effects were pro duced were small effects. Automation and computerization do not appear to change the nature of work in a fundamen tal way.
Again we must look not just at immedi ate impact but at system effects. Facto ry and office automation are laborsaving technologies. The jobs they eliminate are mostly jobs that were already relatively routine. Therefore, when we look at the impact on the tabor force as a whole, we expect to see automation bringing about an overall decrease in the percentage of persons engaged in routine work of these kinds. Correspondingly, there will be a larger percentage of employees than be fore m service occupations and prob ably also in technical occupations. The work-satisfaction studies discussed eartier .show differences among occupation al groups of precisely this kind. From these data it appears that if factory oper atives and clerical workers decline as a fraction of the labor force, while service workers, sales personnel, and profession al and technical workers increase, there will be a net increase in reported job satisfaction-unless, of course, a com pensating shift takes place in aspirations, a possibility we must not dismiss.
On all counts, then, we must acquit the computer technology of the charges that it has been and will be a cause of widespread alienation from work. Empir ically, we find no signs 'of a downward trend in work satisfactions, and when we look at the actual impact of automation upon the workplace and the work force, we find no reason why such a trend should be expected. On the contrary, the newer technologies may even have a modest humanizing effect on the nature of work. The notion of a Golden Age of work prior to the Industrial Revolution must also be dismissed as romanticism, unsupported by such evidence as has been examined.
Control and Privacy
The potential of computers for increas ing the control of organizations or so ciety over their members and for in vading the privacy of those members has caused considerable concern. The issues are important but are too complex to be discussed in detail here. I shall therefore restrict myself to a few comments which will serve rather to illustrate this com plexity than to provide definitive an swers.
A first observation is that our concern here is for competitive aspects of so ciety, the power of one individual or group relative to others. Technologies tend to be double-edged in competitive situations, particularly when they are available to both competitors. For ex ample, the computerization of credit in formation about individuals facilitates the assembly of such information from many sources, and its indefinite reten tion and accessibility. On the other hand, it also facilitates auditing such informa tion to determine its sources and reliabili ty. With appropriate legal rules of the game, an automated system can provide more reliable information than a more primitive one and can be surrounded by more effective safeguards against abuse. Some of us might prefer, for good rea sons or bad. not to have our credit checked at all. But if credit checking is a function that must be performed, a strong case can be made for making it more responsible by automating it, with appropriate provision for auditing its op eration.
Similarly, much has been said of the potential for embezzlement in computer ized accounting systems, and cases have occurred. Embezzlement, however, was known before computers, and the com puter gives auditors as well as embezz lers powerful new weapons. It is not at all clear which way the balance has been tilted.
The privacy issue has been raised most insistently with respect to the crea tion and maintenance of longitudinal data files that assemble information about persons from a multitude of sources. Files of this kind would be high ly valuable for many kinds of economic and social research, but they are bought at too high a price if they endanger hu man freedom or seriously enhance the opportunities of blackmailers. While such dangers should not be ignored, it should be noted that the lack of compre hensive data files has never been the limiting barrier to the suppression of hu man freedom. The Watergate criminals made extensive, if unskillful, use of elec tronics, but no computer played a role in their conspiracy. The Nazis operated with horrifying effectiveness and thor oughness without the benefits of any kind of mechanized data processing.
Making the computer the villain in the invasion of privacy or encroachment on civil liberties simply diverts attention from the real dangers. Computer data banks can and must be given the highest degree of protection from abuse. But we must be careful, also, that we do not employ such crude methods of protec tion as to deprive our society of impor tant data it needs to understand its own social processes and to analyze its prob lems. -
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Man's View of Man
Perhaps the most important question of all about the computer is what it has done and will do to man's view of him self and his place in the universe. The most heated attacks on the computer are not focused on its possible economic effects, its presumed destruction of job satisfactions, or its threats to privacy and liberty, but upon the claim that it causes people to be viewed, and to view themselves, as "machines" (10) .
To get at the real issues, we must first put aside one verbal confusion. All of us are familiar with a wide variety of ma chines, most of which predated the com puter. Consequently, the word "ma chine" carries with it many conno tations: of rigidity, of simplicity, of repetitive behavior, and so on. If we call anything a machine, we implicitly attrib ute these characteristics to it. Hence, if a computer is a machine, it must behave rigidly, simply, and repetitively. It fol lows that computers cannot be pro grammed to behave like human beings.
The fallacy in the argument, of course, lies in supposing that, because we have applied the term "machine" to comput ers, computers must behave like older forms of machines. But the central signif icance of the computer derives from the fact that it falsifies these earlier con notations. It can, in fact, be programmed to behave flexibly, in complex ways, and not repetitively at all. We must either get rid of the connotations of the term, or stop calling computers "machines."
There is a more fundamental question behind the verbal one. It is essentially the question that was raised by Darwin ism, and by the Copernican revolution centuries earlier. The question is wheth er the dignity of man, his sense of worth and self-respect depends upon his being something special and unique in the uni verse. As I have said elsewhere (2, p.
27):
The definition of man's uniqueness has al ways formed the kernel of his cosmological and ethical systems. With Copernicus and Galileo, he ceased to be the species located at the center of the universe, attended by sun and stars. With Darwin, he ceased to be the species created and specially endowed by God with soul and reason. With Freud, he ceased to be the species whose behavior was-potentially-governable by rational mind. As we begin to produce mechanisms that think and learn, he has ceased to be the species uniquely capable of complex, in telligent manipulation of his environment.
What the computer and the progress in artificial intelligence challenge is an ethic that rests on man's apartness from the rest of nature. An alternative ethic, of course, views man as a part of nature, governed by natural law, subject to the forces of gravity and the demands of his body. The debate about artificial in telligence and the simulation of man's thinking is, in considerable part, a con frontation of these two views of man's place in the universe. It is a new chapter in the vitalism-mechanism controversy.
Issues that are logically distinct some times become stuck together with the glue of emotion. Several such issues arise here:
To what extent can human behavior be simulated by computer?
In what areas of work and life should the computer be programmed to aug ment or replace human activities?
How far should we proceed to explore the human mind by psychological .re search that makes use of computer simu lation?
The first of these three issues will only be settled, over the years, by the success or failure of research efforts in artificial intelligence and computer simulation. Whatever our beliefs about the ultimate limits of simulation, it is clear that the current state of the art has nowhere ap proached those limits.
The second question will be settled anew each year by a host of individual and public decisions based on the chang ing computer technology, the changing economics of computer applications, and our attention to the social consequences of those applications.
The answer to the third question de pends upon our attitudes toward the myths of Pandora and Prometheus. One viewpoint is that knowledge can be dan gerous-there are enough historical ex amples-and that the attempt to arrive at a full explanation of man's ability to think might be especially dangerous. A different point of view, closer to my own, is that knowledge is power to pro duce new outcomes, outcomes that were not previously attainable. To what ex tent these outcomes will be good or bad depends on the purposes they serve, and it is not easy, in advance, to predict the good and bad uses to which any particu lar technology will be put. Instead, we must look back over human history and try to assess whether, on balance, man's gradual emergence from a state of igno-* ranee about the world and about himself has been something we should celebrate or regret. To believe that knowledge is to be preferred to ignorance is to believe that the human species is capable of progress and. on balance, has progressed over the centuries. Knowledge about the human mind can make an important con tribution to that progress. It is a belief of this kind that persuades researchers in artificial intelligence that their endeavor is an important and exciting chapter in man's great intellectual adventure.
Summary
From an economic standpoint, the modern computer is simply the most re cent of a long line of new technologies that increase productivity and cause a gradual shift from manufacturing to ser vice employment. The empirical evi dence provides no support for the claim sometimes made that the computer "mechanizes" and "dehumanizes" work. Perhaps the greatest significance of the computer lies in its impact on Man's view of himself. No longer accept ing the geocentric view of the universe, he now begins to learn that mind, too, is a phenomenon of nature, explainable in terms of simple mechanisms. Thus the computer aids him to obey, for the first time, the ancient injunction, "Know thy self."
